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There has been growing concern in recent years that patents confer too 
much power in the context of standard setting organizations (“SSOs”), 
creating a “hold-up problem” for implementers. Those concerned often 
urge antitrust enforcers to intervene or claim SSOs should establish patent 
policies that better protect implementers. This Article explains why these 
concerns undermine incentives to innovate and proposes a “New 
Madison” approach for the application of antitrust law to intellectual 
property rights. The New Madison approach, inspired by the writings of 
James Madison in the Founding Era, has four basic premises: (1) patent 
hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore antitrust 
law should not be used as a tool to police contractual commitments patent 
holders make to SSOs; (2) SSOs should not become vehicles for 
implementers to skew conditions in their favor when incorporating a 
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patented technology; (3) SSOs and courts should have a very high burden 
before adopting rules that severely restrict the right of patent holders to 
exclude or—even worse—adopting rules that amount to a de facto 
compulsory licensing scheme; (4) a unilateral and unconditional refusal 
to license a patent should be considered per se legal from the perspective 
of the antitrust laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many in the patent community champion Thomas Jefferson as the 
father of patent law.1 President Jefferson’s contributions and public 
influence in this area cannot be understated, as he was the first lead 
patent examiner in the United States,2 and his writings on patent policy 
were influential in the early years of the Republic. But, lately, it has 
been vogue among some critics of the U.S. patent system to selectively 
 
1 The Supreme Court in the mid-Twentieth Century was a primary mover in this regard.  
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966). See generally Adam Mossoff, 
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent 
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 961 (2007) (explaining that the 
Court’s “lengthy and numerous quotations from Jefferson’s writings established his views as the 
historical policy foundation for American patent law”). 
2 Jefferson served this role in his capacity as Secretary of State. The Patent Act of 1790 gave 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General together the duty to 
consider patent applications, and any two of these officials could grant a patent. The Patent Act 
of 1793 changed course and created a registration-based (rather than examination-based) system.  
See Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), aff’d and remanded, 566 
U.S. 431 (2012).  
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quote Jefferson to make the case that intellectual property rights ought 
to be reined in.3 
I submit that the true father of U.S. patent law was the Founding 
Father principally responsible for drafting the Constitution, James 
Madison. 
Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers that “[t]he copyright of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of 
common law,” and that “[t]he right to useful inventions seems with 
equal reason to belong to the inventors.”4 Madison went on to note a 
policy rationale for patent rights, stating that “the public good fully 
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”5 Analogizing patent rights 
to common law rights was a truly revolutionary position. In Great 
Britain, patents were conferred on an arbitrary basis by the King or 
Queen to political and economic allies, often with little regard for the 
utility of the invention.6 
The notion that “rights” should belong to inventors and that this right 
“coincides” with “the public good” was not widely shared at the 
time.7 Indeed, Benjamin Franklin, the famous inventor, intellectual, and 
founder of the University of Pennsylvania, took a more magnanimous 
approach. He wrote in his autobiography that he did not oppose the use 
of his inventions without compensation, as he had “no desire of profiting 
from patents himself, and hat[ed] disputes.”8 
The exchanges between Jefferson and Madison on the question of 
patent rights in 1788 are therefore illuminating of Madison’s intellectual 
influence. Reflecting the general anti-monopoly sentiment at the time, 
Jefferson wrote from his post in Paris that “the benefit even of limited 
 
3 See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 1, at 962 n.42, 963-64 & n.46 (citing examples); Eric E. 
Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
1935, 1941 (2014). 
4 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
5 Id. 
6 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (noting “the power often exercised 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown . . . . granting monopolies to 
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public”); Tyler 
T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 912-18 (2002). One of the more (in)famous instances was 
The Case of Monopolies, which condemned an “odious monopoly” in playing cards granted by 
Queen Elizabeth. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (K.B. 1603). 
7 See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 6, at 926 (“Jefferson’s concerns were widely shared by 
others at the time.”).   
8 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 124 (John 
Bigelow ed., Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1906) (1791). 
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monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general 
suppression.”9 
In response, Madison acknowledged that monopolies “are justly 
classed among the greatest nuisances in Government.”10 But he 
recognized a limited exception for patents. “[I]s it clear,” he asked 
Jefferson, “that as encouragement to literary works and ingenious 
discoveries, [monopolies] are not too valuable to be wholly 
renounced?”11 Madison answered his own question, demonstrating a 
nuanced understanding of how to balance concerns about monopolies 
with creating incentives to innovate: “Monopolies are sacrifices of the 
many to the few. . . . Where the power . . . is in the many not in the few, 
the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is 
much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed 
to the many.”12 
Madison understood that replacing monarchy with democracy 
reversed the threat of the misapplication of power, creating a risk that 
patent holders might suffer from the tyranny of the majority seeking to 
benefit unfairly from their innovation. 
Madison’s view ultimately prevailed in the text of the Constitution, 
tying the right to a patent to innovation, or “the progress of science and 
useful arts.”13 
Remarkably, the word “right” appears only once in the original 
Constitution—which took effect two years before the Bill of Rights was 
ratified—in the Copyright and Patent Clause. The reward of a patent for 
a fixed period aligned the interests of inventors, who need incentives to 
innovate, with the interests of the public, who want the fruits of 
innovation. It was an ingenious compromise that unleashed the power 
of innovation in the young Republic. 
 
9 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July 31, 1788, available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0147. 
10 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0218 [hereinafter “Oct. 17, 1788 
Madison Letter”]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. Though both Jefferson and Madison conceptualized patents as conferring 
“monopolies,” that is not presumptively true from the perspective of the antitrust laws. See 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY § 2.2 (2017) (“The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret 
necessarily confers market power upon its owner. . . . If an intellectual property right does confer 
market power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws.”). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8.   
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This history would not be complete without noting that, in the end, 
Thomas Jefferson shifted his perspective on patents to embrace a more 
Madisonian position. He wrote Madison in 1789 that he would support 
an article in the Bill of Rights specifying that “[m]onopolies may be 
allowed to persons for their own productions in literature and their own 
inventions in the arts” for a fixed term.14 Jefferson went on to become 
the administrator of the patent system under the 1790 Patent Act, and 
authored the subsequent 1793 Patent Act.15 In his writings, Jefferson 
voiced his support for patent protection for invention on the ground that 
“ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”16 
In recent months I have found inspiration in this history and 
Madison’s dogged perseverance in favor of strong patent protections—
a view that stood at odds with much of the received wisdom and practice 
of the day. 
There has been a shift in recent years toward what I would call a 
“retro-Jefferson” view of patents as conferring too much power that 
ought to be curbed, either through reinterpreting antitrust law or 
establishing patent policies of standard setting organizations (“SSO”) in 
order to favor implementers who practice on a patent when they build 
new technologies. Many advocates of reducing the power of intellectual 
property rights cite the so-called “hold-up” problem in the context of 
SSOs. As many of you know, I believe these concerns are largely 
misplaced.17 Instead, I favor what I call the “New Madison” approach 
to the application of antitrust law to intellectual property rights.   
The New Madison approach, if I may, has four basic premises that 
are aimed at ensuring that patent holders have adequate incentives to 
innovate and create exciting new technologies, and that licensees have 
appropriate incentives to implement those technologies. 
First, hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and 
therefore antitrust law should not be used as a tool to police FRAND 
commitments that patent holders make to standard setting organizations. 
Second, standard setting organizations should not become vehicles 
for concerted actions by market participants to skew conditions for 
patented technologies’ incorporation into a standard in favor of 
 
14 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1789, available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0354. 
15 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). 
16 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans, May 2, 1807, available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5538. 
17 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General – Antitrust Division, “Take It To 
the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law” (Nov. 10, 
2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download. 
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implementers because this can reduce incentives to innovate and 
encourage patent hold-out. 
Third, because a key feature of patent rights is the right to exclude, 
standard setting organizations and courts should have a very high 
burden before they adopt rules that severely restrict that right or—even 
worse—adopt rules that amount to a de facto compulsory licensing 
scheme. 
Fourth, consistent with the fundamental right to exclude, from the 
perspective of the antitrust laws, a unilateral and unconditional refusal 
to license a patent should be considered per se legal. 
I. PATENT HOLD-UP IS NOT AN ANTITRUST PROBLEM 
To understand what I mean when I say that patent hold-up is not an 
antitrust problem, it is important to step back to consider the purpose of 
antitrust law—what it does, and what it should not do. At its core, 
antitrust law aims to protect competition and consumers.18 
Antitrust law is guided by a consumer welfare standard, which dates 
back to the origins of the Sherman Act.19 The ultimate focus on the 
consumer gained prominence in the late 1970s and 1980s through the 
intellectual leadership of Judge Robert Bork,20 Judge Frank 
Easterbrook,21 and others.22 This standard sharpens the focus of antitrust 
 
18 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition 
as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, 
and the greatest material progress . . . . But even were that premise open to question, the policy 
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”). 
19 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978) (“The Sherman Act was clearly 
presented and debated as a consumer welfare prescription.”); Charles S. Dameron, Note, Present 
at Antitrust’s Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman Act’s State Statutory Forerunners, 
125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1078 (2016) (explaining that the Sherman Act’s state predecessors were 
designed to promote what we now call consumer welfare, and that “[t]he federal courts’ current 
focus on consumer welfare should be understood not as a modern contrivance, but as a faithful 
application of the Sherman Act as it was written”). 
20 BORK, supra note 19, at 66. 
21 Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1698 (1986) 
(explaining that doubts expressed by “Chicago School” antitrust scholars about earlier models 
of antitrust policy “coupled with data backing up many of their claims, have coincided with a 
change in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence that emphasizes efficiency and 
consumers’ welfare”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18 
(1984) (explaining that the antitrust plaintiff “should be required to demonstrate that the 
defendant's practices are capable of enriching the defendant by harming consumers”). 
22 E.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see William E. Kovacic, The 
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scrutiny to anticompetitive practices that are harmful to consumers, 
rather than competitors, so that the antitrust laws are not misapplied to 
advance social goals unrelated to consumer welfare and efficiency. 
Importantly, however, the consumer welfare standard is not 
synonymous with a policy always favoring lower prices.23 For example, 
high demand for an exciting new product may drive up its price, but that 
price increase may simply reflect consumer preference for a superior 
product relative to alternatives.24 Antitrust law is intended to protect this 
behavior, not punish it, so that others will have incentives to innovate 
and compete themselves, all for the benefit of consumers.25 Such 
dynamic competition should be encouraged by our enforcement 
policies. 
Rather than focusing on prices in isolation, antitrust law instead 
protects consumers where practices also harm competition—that is, they 
harm some “competitive process” in a manner that causes harm to 
consumers in the form of above-competitive prices, lower output, or 
reduced efficiency.26 Indeed, directly showing harm to end-consumers 
 
Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 
36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1444 (1990) (explaining that Areeda and Turner “proposed an average 
variable cost pricing test” that “made courts and enforcement agencies far more skeptical of 
predatory pricing allegations”). 
23 I note that Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen has thoughtfully expressed a similar point in 
criticizing the application of antitrust law to FRAND disputes. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 
“What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Antitrust?” at 3 (Sept. 22, 2016), available 
at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/985823/concurrence_dinner_sp
eech_092216.pdf (“Simply condemning a high price, a refusal to deal, or the use of a SEP 
without showing harm to supply- and demand-side limits on market power, however, is not 
antitrust. It is regulatory action meant to reengineer market outcomes to reflect enforcers’ 
preferences.”). 
24 See Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Competitive markets are characterized by both price and quality competition, and a firm’s 
comparatively high price may simply reflect a superior product.”); Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“Generally you 
must pay more for higher quality.”). 
25 See, e.g., Verizon Comm’cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (noting that “charging of monopoly prices . . . is an important element of the free-
market system”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, 
AND COMPETITIVENESS 119, 122-23 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (“An 
antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5 percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent 
the annual rate at which innovation lowers the cost of production would be a calamity.”). 
26 See NYNEX Corp. v. Dicson, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1998) (explaining that higher 
telephone rates from consumers did not flow “from a less competitive market,” but from lawfully 
acquired market power, and that the plaintiff had to “allege and prove harm . . . to the competitive 
process, i.e., to competition itself”); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (“The purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the modern cases, 
is to protect the competitive process as a means of promoting economic efficiency.”). 
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is not always necessary to prove a violation of the antitrust laws. For 
example, collusion among buyers to push input prices down—what 
economists call a monopsony effect—may violate the antitrust laws 
because there is harm to competition even though it results in lower 
prices.27 
This is where theories that unilateral patent hold-up is an antitrust 
problem go wrong. Stating that a patent holder can derive higher 
licensing fees through hold-up simply reflects basic commercial reality.  
Condemning this practice, in isolation, as an antitrust violation, while 
ignoring equal incentives of implementers to “hold out,” risks creating 
“false positive” errors of over-enforcement that would discourage 
valuable innovation. 
Advocates of using antitrust law to reduce the supposed risk of 
patent hold-up fail to identify an actual harm to the competitive process 
that warrants intervention. If an inventor participates in a standard-
setting process and wins support for including a patented technology in 
a standard, that decision does not magically transform a lawful patent 
right into an unlawful monopoly. To be sure, that decision gives the 
patent holder some bargaining power in claiming a piece of the surplus 
created by standardization. And, it would require the patent holder to 
live up to commitments they bargained for, which are enforceable by 
contract laws. But standard setting decisions are intended to be a 
recognition that a technology is superior to its alternatives. A favorable 
SSO decision, like a patent itself, is a reward for an innovator’s 
meritorious contribution whose wide-ranging benefits can ripple 
throughout the economy, contributing to dynamic competition.  
Arguments that inclusion in a standard confers market power that could 
harm competition typically rest on the unreasonable assumption that the 
winning technology is no better than its rivals.28 
It is therefore unsurprising that proponents of using antitrust law to 
police FRAND commitments principally rely on models devoid of 
economic or empirical evidence that hold-up is a real phenomenon,29 
 
27 See Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) 
(“[B]uyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the members of 
the cartel below the competitive level, are illegal per se. Just as a seller’s cartel enables the 
charging of monopoly prices, a buyer’s cartel enables the charging of monopsony prices.”).  
28 See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 
J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1, 36-41 (2017). 
29 Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for ‘Patent Holdout’ Threaten 
to Dismantle FRAND, and Why it Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1388 (2018) 
(“[D]etailed empirical studies . . . have all come to the same conclusion: theoretical concerns 
regarding patent holdup and royalty stacking have not borne out in industries subject to 
innovation-driven standardization, such as mobile handsets, where the evidence points to the 
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much less one that harms competition. Since hold-up theories gained 
traction in the early 2000s, it is striking that they still remain an 
empirical enigma in the academic literature.30 Antitrust law demands 
evidence-based enforcement, without which there is a real threat of 
undermining incentives to innovate. 
That is why I believe so strongly that antitrust law should play no 
role in policing unilateral FRAND commitments where contract or 
common law remedies would be adequate.31 I worry that courts and 
enforcers have overly indulged theories of patent hold-up as a supposed 
competition problem,32 while losing sight of the basic policies of 
antitrust law. They lose sight of the fact that antitrust law is not just 
remedial; it is, importantly, intended to deter through the threat of treble 
damages.33 As enforcers, we have a responsibility to ensure that antitrust 
policy remains sound, so that U.S. consumers continue to enjoy the 
benefits of dynamic competition and innovation, and so we do not 
export unsound theories of antitrust liability abroad, where 
economically dubious enforcement actions can have serious, harmful 
effects on U.S. businesses, consumers, and workers. 
 
sharp lowering of prices continuous innovation, low aggregate patent royalty payments, and 
increasing market penetration.”). 
30 See Galetovic & Haber, supra note 28, at 9 (“At the same time that there are self-evident 
stelae contradicting patent-holdup theory, there is no positive evidence in support of its core 
predictions.”); Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: 
Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
STANDARD SETTING, at 7 (Nov. 18, 2014),  
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%2
82014%2984&doclanguage=en (“Despite the 15 years proponents of the theories have had to 
amass evidence, the empirical studies conducted thus far have not shown that holdup or royalty 
stacking is a common problem in practice.”). 
31 Delrahim, supra note 17, at 7-9; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin & 
Joshua D. Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust To Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, at 6-7 (2015). 
32 E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, “Policy Statement on 
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments” (Jan. 
8, 2013), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf [hereinafter 
“DOJ-PTO Joint Policy Statement”]; see Layne-Farrar, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that “several 
competition agencies have weighed in either directly or indirectly” on theories of patent hold-
up, and “[t]aking their cue from the[se] debates . . . manufacturers implementing standards 
moved patent holdup and royalty stacking arguments into court filings, complaints at 
competition agencies, and proposals to change standard setting rules”). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
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II. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BETTER PROTECT 
AGAINST HOLD-OUT TO ENSURE MAXIMUM INCENTIVES TO 
INNOVATE  
The second premise of the New Madison approach I advocate is that 
standard setting organizations, as collective bodies, themselves should 
avoid over-indulging theories of patent hold-up, to the detriment of 
patent rights. SSOs should instead strive to ensure that their patent 
policies create maximum incentives for innovators to invent (or at a 
minimum don’t curtail incentives to innovate), and for licensees to 
implement.34 
 Achieving this goal is not an easy task. At minimum, it requires a 
recognition that implementer hold-out poses a more serious threat to 
innovation than innovator hold-up. To be sure, both practices threaten 
to undermine innovation through under-investment in new technology. 
But, there is an asymmetry between the two: innovators must make 
significant upfront investments in technology before they know whether 
the investments will pay off, whereas implementers can delay at least 
some of their investments in a technology until after royalty rates have 
been determined.35 
To the extent antitrust law should play a role, it is to ensure that 
concerted action among implementers or innovators does not occur at 
any level of the supply chain. Specifically, as I noted this past Fall, the 
Antitrust Division will be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose that 
appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP 
creators to implementers, or vice versa.36 What do I mean by that? As 
enforcers, we have only limited insight into the patent policies of 
various standard-setting organizations, and we do not seek to impose a 
top-down mandate to skew the playing field clearly in the direction of 
innovators or implementers. But we expect there to be some symmetry 
between these competing interests, which manifests itself in two ways. 
 First, at SSOs, we hope to see a diversity of views represented on 
patent policy committees to give us confidence that patent policies are 
based on reasoned and unbiased decision-making. We strongly 
 
34 To be sure, innovation occurs at different levels of the supply chain in most industries, 
with patent holders and implementers each adding value that ultimately benefits consumers.  I 
encourage SSOs to adopt patent policies that ensure that there are appropriate incentives for 
innovation at every level. 
35 Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and Two-Sided Hold-Up, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, August 2015, at 2-3; Bernhard Ganglmair, Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. 
Werden, Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 
60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249, 260-61 (2012); Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 17. 
36 Delrahim, supra note 17, at 11. 
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encourage SSOs to avoid allowing voting blocks of competitors to 
dominate decisions on patent policy or on which technology to 
incorporate into a standard. That kind of action would confirm the 
Supreme Court’s observation that SSOs “can be rife with opportunities 
for anticompetitive activity.”37 Ensuring that no voting blocks take hold 
would help negate the risk that a rule or standard is the product of a 
buyer’s or seller’s cartel. As long as an SSO’s IP policies are the product 
of a consensus or a clear majority that includes both standard-essential 
patent holders and implementers, the Department of Justice should have 
no reason for concern. On the other hand, if an SSO’s policymaking 
decisions appear to be dominated by implementers, and the resulting 
policies or standards appear to be heavily skewed toward implementers 
and away from innovators, that’s already two strikes.38 
 Second, I believe innovation policy would benefit from a diversity 
of patent policies across standard setting organizations. Optimally, 
competition can begin to emerge among SSOs within the same industry, 
with dueling patent policies that allow for the more efficient regime to 
prevail. Across industries, we expect that patent policies and the 
requirements for the inclusion of patented technology in a standard will 
vary depending on the technology in question. By contrast, I worry that 
advocacy by government agencies in recent years could lead SSOs to 
adopt a uniform approach to articulating specific commitments 
necessary for inclusion in a standard—an approach that may be skewed 
too far in the direction of implementers. This unfortunate trend should 
not continue. 
III. PATENT HOLDER INJUNCTION RIGHTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED, 
NOT PERSECUTED 
The third premise of the New Madison approach to antitrust law and 
intellectual property is to respect the core of what it means to hold an IP 
right—namely, the right to exclude.39 In his letters to Thomas Jefferson, 
 
37 Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982); see also 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (“There is no doubt 
that the members of such [standard setting] associations often have economic incentives to 
restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious 
potential for anticompetitive harm. . . . Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have 
traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.”). 
38 The same would be true if an SSO’s policymaking decisions appear to be dominated by 
IP holders and the resulting standards appear heavily skewed in their favor. 
39 35 U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right 
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
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Madison acknowledged that state-conferred monopolies are “among the 
greatest nuisances in government,”40 but maintained that these “nuisances” 
could be harnessed to serve the greater good of social progress and 
innovation through patent protection. His analogy of patents to the 
“common law . . . copyright of authors” in The Federalist Papers41 is 
telling because, at the time, the copyright of authors was understood as a 
property right.42 Equipping patent holders with the property right to 
exclude therefore goes hand-in-hand with the goals Madison envisioned 
for the U.S. patent regime. 
Understanding patent rights, once conferred, as a form of property right 
helps frame the current debate over injunctions, and demonstrates how far 
we’ve strayed off course.43 Under current Federal Circuit law, a standard-
essential patent holder faces significant difficulty in establishing a right to 
an injunction instead of damages.44 In a worrisome trend, some 
commentators have suggested that the mere act of seeking an injunction 
order to prevent infringement raises competition concerns,45 and, with a 
degree of hubris, litigants have advanced such theories as a basis for 
antitrust liability.46 Taken together, these trends fundamentally transform 
the nature of patent rights away from their constitutional underpinnings. 
 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still 
Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 109 (1990) (“Patents give a right to exclude, just as 
the law of trespass does with real property.”). 
40 Oct. 17, 1788 Madison Letter, supra note 10. 
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 4. 
42 See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 982 (explaining that Blackstone in Great Britain and 
Chancellor Kent in America conceptualized copyright as a right of property). 
43 See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2655, 2667 (1994) (“Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude 
granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and 
would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and technological 
research.” (quoting Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
44 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing decision 
finding that commitment to license on FRAND terms strips patent holder of right to seek 
injunction, but finding that such a commitment “strongly suggest[s]” that damages for 
infringement should be adequate). 
45 See, e.g., Greg Sivinski, Patently Obvious: Why Seeking Injunctions on Standard-
Essential Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Oct. 2013, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/SivinskiOct-2.pdf; cf. DOJ-
PTO Joint Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 6 (asserting that an injunction order against 
infringement of a FRAND-encumbered patent “may harm competition and consumers by 
degrading one of the tools SDOs employ to mitigate the threat of such opportunistic actions by 
the holders of F/RAND-encumbered patents that are essential to their standards”). 
46 See, e.g., Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-723-RGA, 2016 WL 1464545, 
at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016); Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims, Huawei Techs. 
Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00052-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 8470351 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 
2016). 
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They convert a property rule into a liability rule,47 and amount to a 
troubling de facto compulsory licensing scheme.48   
It is not difficult to understand why that is the case, particularly in the 
context of standard setting. If a patent holder effectively loses its right to 
an injunction whenever a licensing dispute arises, or is deterred from 
seeking an injunction due to the prospect of treble damages, an 
implementer can freely infringe, knowing that the most he or she will 
eventually have to pay is a reasonable royalty rate.49 Implementers have a 
strong incentive to pursue this course while holding out from accepting a 
license due to the high injunction bar for innovators that make FRAND 
commitments.50 It is a harmful arbitrage that should be discouraged. 
Some may be skeptical of this claim, given that “willful” infringement 
entitles a patent holder to compensation up to treble damages.51 But it is 
extremely difficult to prove willfulness, a demanding standard that the 
Supreme Court emphasizes should be limited “to egregious cases of 
misconduct.”52 Under recent developments of the law, the standard for 
obtaining an injunction and the standard for proving willfulness both work 
to the benefit of implementers and significantly limit the downside risk of 
infringement. This results in a de facto compulsory licensing scheme for 
FRAND-encumbered patents deemed “standard essential,” and could 
serve as a disincentive for innovation or for patent holders to contribute 
technology to the standard-setting process in the first place. Deterring the 
 
47 See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 20-21; Merges, supra note 43, at 2664-67. 
48 See Anne Layne-Farrar, Business Models and the Standard Setting Process, in THE PROS 
AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 34, 48 (Konkurrensverket 2010) (“Once upstream patent 
holders have no option of seeking injunctive relief, they will have no bargaining power at all in 
licensing negotiations. Especially within standard setting contexts, where the parties typically 
commit to license via a FRAND promise, such a rule would amount to compulsory licensing, 
leaving upstream patent holders at the mercy of licensees.”). Some commentators have argued 
that such a scheme could lead to “an eventual breakdown of the FRAND-enabled innovation 
marketplace.” Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 15. 
49 See id. at 17. As one commentator has noted, this free-riding effect is particularly 
pernicious because patent holders cannot assert an entire portfolio of infringed patents at the 
same time. See Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout Is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain 
Old Patent Infringement, CPI NORTH AMERICA COLUMN, at 2 (2016) (“[E]ven if the SEP holder 
prevails in a given infringement action, standard implementers can (and typically do) proclaim 
that they are only obligated to take a license to the specifically adjudicated patents, which have 
been proven to be valid and infringed.”). 
50 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: 
The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek 
Injunctions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 4 (2014) (“[W]e have not found even one injunction or 
exclusion order that actually kept a product off the shelf because it infringed a SEP.”); Layne-
Farrar, supra note 30, at 6 (“While an injunction is a strong penalty, these have rarely ever been 
granted for SEP infringements.”). 
51 See 35 U.S.C. § 284; Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
52 Id. at 1935. 
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right to enjoin other parties from infringement—particularly 
competitors—seriously reduces incentives to innovate, much in the same 
way that the DOJ’s enforcement policies in the 1970s prevented field of 
use restrictions in patent licensing. This can cause great harm to 
consumers,53 and is particularly problematic as more and more products 
and services come to depend on standardized technology. 
IV. A UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL REFUSAL TO LICENSE A 
VALID PATENT SHOULD BE PER SE LEGAL 
The foregoing analysis leads me to the fourth premise of the “New 
Madison” approach, which is that a unilateral and unconditional refusal to 
license a valid patent should be per se legal.54 A refusal to license should 
not be a source from which a competitor or customer may seek treble 
damages under the Sherman Act. That is because competition and 
consumers both benefit when inventors have full incentives to exploit their 
patent rights. This requires an assurance to inventors that they need not 
subsidize their competitors’ business models if they prefer not to do so.  
The Supreme Court clarified as much in Trinko, explaining that a refusal 
to deal is not an antitrust violation if the parties have never done business 
with each other, because “there is no duty to aid competitors.”55 A de facto 
compulsory licensing scheme turns this policy underlying the Sherman 
Act on its head. 
To that end, I urge scholars and policymakers to give careful 
consideration to the underlying policies of the Trinko decision. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that its earlier Aspen Skiing decision was 
merely a “limited exception” to the rule that there is no duty to deal under 
the antitrust laws.56 But some, particularly some of the newer enforcement 
agencies abroad, may think the “exception” leaves room for a licensee to 
bring an antitrust suit if a patent holder terminates or refuses to renew the 
licensing agreement.57 The licensor thus could be forced to litigate for 
 
53 See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 17, 21 (“[I]n the face of high transaction costs, 
pure liability rules tend both to encourage ‘patent holdout’ and to shortchange innovators in ex 
post allocations of the cooperative surplus created by FRAND negotiations.”).  
54 Delrahim, supra note 17, at 8; see Ginsburg et al., supra note 50, at 5 (explaining that 
explaining that an antitrust remedy for seeking an injunction “would be harmful” to consumer 
welfare and that “[o]verdeterring SEP holders from seeking an injunction effectively diminishes 
the value of their patents and hence their incentive to innovate”). 
55 Verizon Comm’cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(2004). 
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years the consequences of a business decision stemming from changed 
competitive dynamics or a new licensing strategy. Antitrust laws should 
not be used to transform an inventor’s one-time decision to offer a license 
to a competitor into a forever commitment that the inventor will continue 
licensing that competitor in perpetuity. 
CONCLUSION 
This past Fall, I urged all of us who care about innovation to consider 
“fresh thinking” about the implications of SSOs and the proper role of 
antitrust.58 So far, I have been encouraged and humbled by the positive 
response. To look forward to the future of standard-essential patents, 
however, we should take a moment to look back to the wisdom of the 
Founding Fathers, and the vision of James Madison in particular. He 
understood the value of strong IP protection as a means of fueling 
innovation and technological progress. I submit that a “New Madison” 
approach to these issues may help restore the promise of patent and 
antitrust law, and unleash America’s full potential for innovation. We 
should, in the words of Madison, continue to recognize that “as 
encouragement to . . . ingenious discoveries,” patent rights are “too 
valuable to renounce,” and that we should fear not that the many are 
sacrificed to the few, but rather that “the few will be unnecessarily 
sacrificed to the many.”59 
 
58 Id. at 14. 
59 Oct. 17, 1788 Madison Letter, supra note 10. 
